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Abstract 
This chapter reviews economic analyses of privacy.  We begin by 
scrutinizing the “free market” critique of privacy regulation.  Welfare 
may be non-monotone in the quantity of information, hence there may 
be excessive incentive to collect information.  This result applies to 
both non-productive and productive information.  Over-investment is 
exacerbated to the extent that personal information is exploited across 
markets.  Further, the “free market” critique does not apply to overt 
and covert collection of information that directly causes harm.  We 
then review research on property rights and challenges in determining 
their optimal allocation.  We conclude with insights from recent 
empirical research and directions for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
Information privacy has been defined as the individual’s ability to 
control the collection and use of personal information (Stigler 1980; 
Westin 1967).  The invention and development of computing 
technologies led to widespread concern about collection of personal 
information in various contexts, including employment, finance, 
marketing, and government.  In response to these concerns, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development published guidelines on 
privacy protection and transborder data flow (OECD 1980), and the 
European Union adopted Directive 95/46/EC on data protection.  The 
EU directive prohibits transfer of information to jurisdictions that do 
not accord adequate protection. 
The development of the Internet and the advent of e-commerce have 
amplified public concern about privacy.  With every website visit, a 
browser leaves an electronic trace which can later be retrieved to 
analyze the consumers’ online browsing and shopping behavior. 
Another technology – the cookie – stores identifying information 
about consumers.  Using clickstream and identifying information, 
websites can profile visitors.  Such profiling could benefit consumers 
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by more precisely identifying their needs.1  However, it can also be 
used to effect price discrimination or exclude individuals with less 
attractive characteristics.2  Some organizations even sell customer 
information to third parties, which subject their customers to further 
privacy intrusion.3 4 
Clearly, technology has significantly changed business practices, but 
new opportunities present new concerns.  Westin (2001) concludes: 
“There has been a well-documented transformation in consumer 
privacy attitudes over the past decade, moving concerns from a 
modest matter for a minority of consumers in the 1980s to an issue of 
 
 
 
1  See, for instance, Moe and Fader (2001) and (2004), Bucklin and Sismeiro 
(2003), Montgomery et al. (2004), and Sismeiro and Bucklin (2004). 
2  “Giving the Web a Memory Cost Its Users Privacy,” New York Times, 
September 4, 2001.  Amazon.com’s application of dynamic pricing illustrates 
consumers’ privacy dilemma (“On the Web, Price Tags Blur; What You Pay 
Could Depend on Who You Are,” Washington Post, September 27, 2000). 
3  For instance, Amazon.com’s privacy policy states: “As we continue to 
develop our business, we might sell or buy stores, subsidiaries, or business 
units. In such transactions, customer information generally is one of the 
transferred business assets… in the unlikely event that Amazon.com, Inc., or 
substantially all of its assets are acquired, customer information will of course 
be one of the transferred assets.”   
4  The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2005a) has taken enforcement action 
against an online shopping cart provider that rented customer information to 
third-party marketers, in violation of the disclosure policies published to 
consumers using the shopping cart. 
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high intensity expressed by more than three-fourths of American 
consumers in 2001”. 
Within the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
oversees personal information privacy in consumer transactions.  In 
the 1990s, the FTC emphasized fair information practices (FIPs) in its 
policy towards consumer privacy.  Subsequently, however, the FTC 
revised its thinking and considered that the cost of obtaining 
consumers’ consent for information sharing and use would far exceed 
the potential benefit (Muris 2003).  According to this view, the FIPs 
were inefficient and the FTC should follow the approach under the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.  This approach generally allows 
the use of personal information, while focusing on enforcement 
against misuses.  Specifically, “the most important objective of a 
privacy agenda should be stopping practices that can harm 
consumers” (Muris 2003). 
The other major privacy issue identified by Muris (2003) was spam: 
“Spam is one of the most daunting consumer protection problems that 
the Commission has ever faced.”  Muris worried whether legislation 
and legal sanctions could resolve the problem of spam. 
Clearly, privacy is an important policy and business issue.  What has 
been the contribution of academic scholarship, and, in particular, 
economics, to the issue?  Academic discourse on individual privacy 
dates back at least to the seminal Harvard Law Review article of 
Warren and Brandeis (1890).  Privacy is a multi-disciplinary issue 
that has been and should be analyzed from multiple perspectives – 
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law, psychology, sociology, political science, and economics.5  
Economics is an especially appropriate discipline as it provides a 
framework to appreciate the key trade-offs in policy towards privacy. 
The earliest economic analyses of privacy focused on the efficiency 
of markets for personal information.   Since the Privacy Act of 1974 
regulated only government records, the immediate issue was whether 
the collection and use of personal information by private-sector 
entities should be regulated.   The “Chicago School” (Stigler 1980; 
Posner 1978, 1979, 1981) contended that regulation is not needed – 
markets for personal information would work as well as markets for 
conventional goods and services.  
However, the Chicago School’s argument ignored the ways in which 
personal information is collected.  Realistically, accurate personal 
information does not come from nowhere; resources must be 
expended to collect the information, and the collection could have 
undesirable consequences on consumer welfare. 
For the most part, the Chicago School focused on just one dimension 
of privacy, viz., secrecy, and overlooked two other dimensions – 
 
 
 
5  See, for example, Culnan and Bies (2003), Eddy et al. (1999), Goodwin 
(1992), Hirshleifer (1980), Laudon (1996), Petty (2000), Posner (1978, 1979, 
1981), Schwartz (1968), Smith (2001), Stigler (1980), Stone and Stone (1990), 
Tolchinsky et al. (1981), and Woodman et al. (1982). 
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autonomy and seclusion (Hirshleifer 1980; Camp and Osorio 2003).  
While secrecy concerns privacy of information, autonomy concerns 
freedom from observation and seclusion concerns the right to be left 
alone.  Besides markets for secrecy, we are also interested to know 
whether markets for autonomy and seclusion work well.6 7 
From an economic standpoint, governments, businesses, and other 
organizations use personal information about individuals in three 
ways.  First, they use personal information to customize goods and 
services, discriminate more effectively between people with differing 
willingness to pay or differing reservation wage, and sort more 
effectively among people with different personal characteristics 
(Mussa and Rosen 1978; Katz 1984; Moorthy 1984; Varian 1985; 
Hart and Tirole 1988; Tirole 1988, Chapter 3; Png 1998, Chapter 9).  
The Chicago School posits that these uses of personal information 
 
 
 
6  Hirshleifer (1980) cited telemarketing as an example of violation of 
autonomy.  Actually, telemarketing requires personal information, viz., a 
telephone number, and involves an intrusion into the right to be left alone, 
hence it involves violation of secrecy and seclusion.  An example that more 
clearly exemplifies autonomy is nude sunbathing.  A peep does not need the 
subject’s personal information to intrude on the subject’s autonomy.  
7  Posner (1981) did acknowledge the definition of privacy as peace and 
autonomy, but he dismissed these aspects by saying “to affix the term privacy to 
human freedom and autonomy (as in Jack Hirshleifer) is simply to relabel an 
old subject – not to identify a new area for economic research … the range of 
economic applications in this area seems limited.” (p. 405) 
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lead to socially efficient outcomes and require no government 
regulation.   
However, the use of personal information to profile individual 
persons imposes an indirect or consequential externality as some 
suffer from paying relatively higher price, receiving a relatively lower 
wage, or being excluded from enjoying a particular good or service.  
Hence, the exploitation of personal information could lead to ex post 
inefficiencies.  Hirshleifer’s (1971) classic analysis shows that the 
result of such information might simply be re-distribution, and so, 
from a social viewpoint, there might be over-investment in 
information.  Even if consumer information is costless, the seller’s 
private incentive to maximize profit may be inconsistent with 
maximizing social welfare.  Some consumers may get priced out of 
the market when more information is available to the seller, even 
though it is socially efficient for them to consume the item (Varian 
1985; Hart and Tirole 1988; Thisse and Vives 1988; Fudenberg and 
Villas-Boas 2006). 
Second, a seller may collect personal information in one market for 
use by itself or others in another market.  Then, the seller may have an 
excessive incentive to collect consumer information, at the expense of 
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some of its own potential consumers (Taylor 2004a).8  That is, the 
option of selling consumer information for extra revenue may further 
reduce social efficiency both from benefit (loss in trades and increase 
in deadweight losses) and cost (the effort in compiling the 
information) perspectives.  
The third way in which organizations use personal information about 
potential clients is to direct unsolicited promotions, in person, by 
mail, telephone and fax, and electronically.  These solicitations 
impose costs of intrusion on recipients and are a direct externality.  
Unsolicited marketing is one type of intrusion against seclusion 
(Camp and Osorio 2003).  A preference for seclusion is like a taste for 
privacy in that intrusions cause a direct externality, unrelated to any 
effect on the terms of any transaction or trading relationship (Laudon 
1996).  Computing technologies have facilitated a flood of unsolicited 
promotions, which cause annoyance and affect productivity.  
However, most privacy research has ignored the implications of these 
uses of personal information. 
Finally, opposing views on privacy and information use have led to 
different suggestions on whether property rights in personal 
 
 
 
8  European Union Directive 2001/29/EC grants copyright protection to 
compilers of databases even if they did not create the information compiled.  
This right would further encourage sellers to develop consumer databases. 
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information should be established and how they should be assigned.  
The Chicago School supports free collection and use of information; 
hence the issue of property rights is moot.  Hermalin and Katz 
(2004b) suggest that individuals might voluntarily reveal their 
personal information to trading partners anyway.  Therefore, it does 
not matter how property rights are assigned.  However, others argue 
that exclusive rights should be granted to individuals so that they can 
control the collection and subsequent use of their information (Noam 
1995b; Laudon 1996). Marketers would then internalize the privacy 
costs that they impose on consumers.  We examine each of these 
arguments and highlight some challenges in determining the optimal 
allocation of property rights. 
This chapter reviews economic analyses of privacy.  Section 2 begins 
with the free market approach.  Sections 3 and 4 discuss the indirect 
consequential externality that arises from use of personal information.  
Section 5 reviews direct externalities.  Then, Sections 6 and 7 discuss 
the possible resolution of privacy through property rights and 
regulations.  Section 8 reports some empirical findings, while Section 
9 concludes with directions for future research. 
 
2. “Free Market” Approach 
The Chicago School (Stigler 1980; Posner 1978, 1979, 1981) 
resolutely affirms that markets for personal information would work 
as well as markets for conventional goods and services.  Government 
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regulation would impede economic efficiency.  For instance, 
unskilled workers would suffer relatively more than skilled workers 
from restrictions on employers in the collection and use of personal 
information about workers.  Likewise, low-income borrowers would 
suffer relatively more than wealthy borrowers from restrictions on 
lenders in the collection and use of personal information about 
borrowers. 
The “free market” approach to privacy may not work efficiently, 
however, for several reasons.  First, the Chicago School focuses on ex 
post efficiency, but overlooks that open and perfect information may 
destroy the basis for some markets with risk and asymmetric 
information (Hermalin and Katz 2004b).  Take the insurance market 
as an example.  If an insurer cannot distinguish persons with different 
health, it may offer medical insurance to healthy and unhealthy 
persons at the same premium.  Then, what the Chicago School views 
as an inefficient cross-subsidy from healthy to unhealthy persons in 
an ex post sense could also be viewed as insurance against bad health 
in an ex ante sense.  However, if the insurer can use personal 
information to distinguish persons by health level, then it would 
differentiate policies according to the person’s health.  Then, 
information collection would have undermined the market for 
insurance against bad health.  The same argument applies to other 
markets where the “quality” on one side is private information.  
Examples include human resources, investments, and betting on 
sports. 
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Second, and more fundamentally, within the context of ex post 
efficiency, the Chicago School’s argument works only when sellers 
have perfect information about consumers.  However, welfare may 
not be monotone in the quantity of personal information (Hermalin 
and Katz 2004b).  In a setting of “second-best”, an increase in the 
quantity of personal information might reduce welfare, and 
accordingly, protection of privacy might raise welfare.  This issue is 
further complicated when personal information is collected in one 
market for use in another.  
Third, the Chicago School critique overlooks various direct 
externalities associated with the collection and use of personal 
information.  These include direct marketing solicitations that overtly 
intrude into personal seclusion, as well as covert intrusions into 
personal secrecy and autonomy.    
The first issue (ex ante vs. ex post efficiency) is fairly trivial and we 
shall not elaborate it here.  The second and third issues concern non-
trivial production and exploitation of personal information, which are 
at the heart of many ongoing privacy debates.  We survey recent 
economic advances on these two issues below.  
 
Most economic analyses focus on overt collection and use of personal 
information, where the subject is aware that her personal information 
is being collected and used.   Following the literature, our review will 
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emphasize overt collection and use.  Where relevant, we will also 
discuss covert collection and use.  
 
3. Within-Market Consequential Externalities 
In this section, we consider how the collection and use of personal 
information within a single market affects the efficiency of market 
outcomes.  The collection and use impose a consequential (rather than 
direct) externality. For the most part, within-market consequential 
externalities apply to the secrecy dimension of privacy.   
Personal information is widely used to devise customized offers 
(products, prices, employment contracts, insurance, etc.) that better 
suit the tastes or characteristics of particular individuals.9  To evaluate 
whether such customization promotes exchange and hence market 
efficiency, many economic analyses draw from the literature of 
asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973; Stiglitz 1975) 
and product differentiation (Mussa and Rosen 1978; Katz 1984; 
Moorthy 1984).   
 
 
 
9  See, for instance, Chen et al. (2001), Chen and Iyer (2002), Acquisti and 
Varian (2005), Calzolari and Pavan (2002), Ghose and Chen (2003), Odlyzko 
(2003), Taylor (2004) and (2005), Wathieu (2002), Chellappa and Sin (2005), 
and Wattal et al. (2004). 
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In the following review, we adopt the classification of Hermalin and 
Katz (2004b) and distinguish two classes of situation where privacy 
might matter.  In one, personal information is not productive – the 
costs of the uninformed party do not depend on the personal 
characteristics of the informed party as, for instance, in the case of 
pure price discrimination.  In the other class, personal information is 
productive – the costs of the uninformed party do depend on the 
personal characteristics of the informed party as, for instance, in the 
case of an employer recruiting workers of differing skill or an insurer 
covering persons with differing health.   
3.1 Non-Productive Information 
Hermalin and Katz (2004b) provide the simplest model of the issue.  
Consider a monopoly that has asymmetric information about 
consumers, where the consumers have either high or low valuation for 
some item.  The marginal cost of the item is sufficiently low that it is 
efficient to provide it to both consumer types.  Generally, the seller’s 
pricing strategy depends on its information about the consumer 
population.  It provides a set of consumption levels from which 
consumers choose and thereby self-select. 
Suppose that, originally, the seller sold only to the high-type 
consumers.  Additional information would enable the seller to better 
sort between high and low types.  If it leads the seller to sell to both 
types, then welfare would rise.  However, suppose that, originally, the 
seller sold to a pool of both high and low types.  If the additional 
information leads the seller to reduce the quantity provided to the low 
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types, it would reduce welfare.  Accordingly, privacy regulation 
(which would reduce the availability of personal information) might 
raise or reduce social welfare.   
Bulow and Klemperer (2006) apply the auction theory concept of 
affiliation to analyze situations where competing sellers acquire 
different pieces of information about a consumer.  While a seller will 
raise price against consumers with a relatively high willingness to pay 
for its product, it would reduce price towards consumers with 
relatively low willingness to pay.  Other sellers would respond to the 
price cuts, and overall, the expected price to the consumer would be 
lower. 
The implications of privacy regulation are more complex in a setting 
that unfolds over time, where consumers may make repeat purchases 
and sellers can condition price on the consumer’s purchase history.  
Research into this aspect overlaps quite closely with the economics of 
“behavior-based price discrimination” (Fudenberg and Tirole 2000), 
which is reviewed by Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) in this 
Handbook.  The pioneering analysis is due to Hart and Tirole (1988).   
For simplicity, we present the analyses of Acquisti and Varian (2005) 
and Taylor (2004a).  As in the static case, there are two types of 
consumer, with the high-type willing to pay more for the item than 
low-type consumers.  Also, the marginal cost of the item is 
sufficiently low that it is efficient to provide it to both types.  The 
difference with the static case is that there are two periods. 
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The seller’s pricing strategy depends on its information about the 
consumer population. With privacy regulation that prevents collection 
of personal information, the seller would set the same price over time, 
which price depends on the composition of the consumer population.  
In particular, if the proportion of low-type consumers is high enough 
(or, more generally, the demand is sufficiently elastic), the seller 
would set a price low enough that both consumer types buy the item, 
and such that the high-type consumers enjoy a positive surplus.  This 
equilibrium is efficient. 
Now, suppose that the seller can infer the consumer types from their 
purchase history.  Specifically, in the first period, the seller can set a 
sufficiently high price that only high types buy, and the remaining 
consumers (who do not buy) are revealed to be low types.  Then, the 
seller can condition prices in subsequent periods on first-period 
purchase behavior, and so, perfectly price discriminate (Acquisti and 
Varian (2005) call this “price conditioning”).  
Accordingly, if personal information collection is feasible, the seller 
faces a tradeoff: by charging a high price in the first period, it forgoes 
profit from the low-type consumers, but it gains from identifying the 
high-type consumers and price discriminating against them in 
subsequent periods.  From the viewpoint of social welfare, the low-
type consumers suffer a deadweight loss from not consuming in the 
first period. 
It is easy to predict what increases the seller’s incentives to collect 
consumer information.  In the stylized example above, a wider gap 
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between the high- and low-type consumers’ valuations, a higher 
proportion of high-type consumers, a longer time horizon (i.e., more 
future repurchases), and more precise addressing of the consumer 
segments, would increase the seller’s incentive to use a high price to 
screen the consumer segments in the first period. 
Note that the collection of personal information could also raise 
welfare.  This arises when, absent the ability to record transaction 
information (and thereby discriminate), the seller chooses to sell only 
to high-type consumers.  By enabling discrimination, the collection of 
purchase history then leads the seller to sell to low-type consumers as 
well, and so, raises welfare.10   
Another consideration is that consumers might also act strategically.  
Suppose again that, when unable to record transaction information, 
the seller sells only to high-type consumers.  If low-type consumers 
can credibly reveal their personal characteristics,11 they would also 
produce information and so persuade the seller to offer them the item 
 
 
 
10  Generally, price discrimination might raise or reduce welfare (Varian 1985). 
11  Students may produce school or university identity cards and seniors may 
show proof of age to qualify for lower prices.  In the employment context, job 
seekers may produce reference letters from past employers, professional 
certificates, and school transcripts to prove their ability. 
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at a lower price.12  The efforts of the seller and low-type consumers to 
produce information are strategic substitutes (Bulow et al. 1985).   
Now, if privacy regulation increased the seller’s cost of information 
collection, then the seller would collect less information.  In turn, this 
would lead low-type consumers to produce more information.  If the 
response of the low-type consumers is sufficiently vigorous, the net 
result might be paradoxical – the total amount of information 
produced and social welfare could both increase (Gould 1980).  
Similarly, relaxing privacy regulation, which reduces the cost of 
information production, could lead to less information being produced 
and reduce welfare.  
The implications of privacy regulation are subtler still in a setting 
with competition among multiple sellers.  As reviewed by Fudenberg 
and Villas-Boas (2006) in this Handbook, even if each seller would 
gain individually by being the only one to engage in price 
conditioning, if all sellers engage in the practice, then it might 
intensify competition and thereby reduce the sellers’ combined 
profits.  Further, as in the monopoly case, privacy regulation may 
raise or lower social welfare.  However, by contrast with the 
 
 
 
12  Hermalin and Katz (2004b) also make this point in discussing property 
rights. 
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monopoly case, the use of price conditioning among competitive 
sellers may raise consumer surplus.13 
Wathieu (2004) addresses a different issue – the impact of privacy 
regulation on the cost of product variety.  Consider a setting where 
consumers have specific tastes for different products.  Ex ante, a seller 
cannot distinguish the consumer types, and it incurs an advertising 
cost to address each individual consumer with a product.  The 
advertising cost must be repeated for each product that the seller 
markets to a particular consumer.  If the seller acquires and uses 
consumers’ personal information to segment the demand, it can 
reduce advertising costs because the advertisements are more 
accurately directed.  In this context, by hindering segmentation, 
“privacy” may increase the sellers’ advertising costs.   
However, despite the saving in advertising costs, when production is 
characterized by economies of scale, allowing the seller to gain access 
to consumer information could lead to excessive product variety.  
With the information, the seller will have excessive incentive to price 
discriminate and extract surplus from mainstream consumers.  In this 
case, mainstream consumers would prefer information privacy, and so 
avoid being identified and hence avoid a higher price.   
 
 
 
13  See also Choudhury et al. (2005) for a related analysis on competition 
between firms that employ personalized pricing technologies. 
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Generally, the collection and use of non-productive personal 
information may redistribute surplus among sellers and consumers, 
but it does not necessarily generate more exchange (Hirshleifer 1971).  
Specifically, the collection and use of customer purchase histories has 
private value to sellers, but need not create social value.  In fact, it 
may diminish social welfare by reducing the consumption of the low-
type consumers.  In the monopoly setting, consumer concerns about 
price discrimination seem to be well justified.  On the other hand, in 
competitive settings, price conditioning may benefit consumers.  
Further, sellers may use personal information to reduce marketing 
costs (Wathieu 2004).  Finally, changes in privacy regulation to adjust 
the cost of collecting or producing personal information may lead to 
conflicting adjustments in the production of information.  Clearly, the 
social value of privacy regulation is ambiguous. 
3.2 Productive Information 
Hermalin and Katz (2004b) provide a simple model of the issue.14  
Competitive employers face a heterogeneous population of workers, 
some of whom have high productivity while others have low 
 
 
 
14 Their setting is not quite the simplest possible, as it supposes there to be 
competition on the seller side.  An even simpler setting would have just a 
monopoly seller. 
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productivity.  Each employer needs just one worker.  In the economic 
efficient allocation, both types of worker would be employed. 
Suppose that the original equilibrium pools high and low types at a 
common wage.  Since both types of worker are employed, this 
equilibrium is efficient.  Now, divide the worker population into two 
pools.  With additional information, employers can more accurately 
identify high-type workers.  If the proportion of high types in the 
“good” pool is sufficiently large (and that in the other “bad” pool is 
low), then in competitive equilibrium, employers will employ all 
workers in the “good” pool at a common wage, but pay a low wage to 
the bad pool.  The low wage would attract only low types, hence the 
high-type workers in the bad pool would be unemployed.  This would 
reduce welfare relative to the original equilibrium.  
By contrast, suppose that the original equilibrium included only low 
types.  This adverse selection equilibrium is not efficient.  Again, 
divide the worker population into two pools, and suppose that 
additional information enables employers to more accurately identify 
high-type workers.   If the proportion of high types in a “good” pool is 
sufficiently large, then in competitive equilibrium, employers will 
employ all workers in the “good” pool at a common wage.  This 
would raise welfare relative to the original equilibrium.  
Taylor (2004b) also addresses the issue of over/under-investment in 
productive personal information in a competitive setting, but using a 
somewhat different setting.  Each employer seeks a worker, who has 
either high or low productivity.   The worker does not know her own 
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productivity.  In the economic efficient allocation, only the high-type 
worker would be employed.  The employer can invest in information 
about the worker.  When the information about high-type workers is 
perfect but information about low-type workers is subject to error, the 
employer will over-invest in information.  However, when the 
information about high-type workers is subject to error but 
information about low-type workers is perfect, the employer will 
under-invest in information.  
The analyses of Hermalin and Katz (2004b) and Taylor (2004b) imply 
that there is no simple rule: whether privacy of personal information 
raises or reduces welfare depends on the circumstances.  
A separate stream of research has considered the role of personal 
information privacy in tax policy.  In this setting, the less-informed 
party is the government.  The government uses income tax to re-
distribute income from high- to low-income earners.  If the 
government sets tax rates after individuals have decided their 
investment in something that increases their future earnings, say 
education, a time consistency problem arises.  Fearing that the 
government will set high tax rates in the future, taxpayers will under-
invest in education (Boadway et al. 1996). 
In this context, a privacy policy is an effective way by which the 
government can commit to lower tax rates in the future (Konrad 
2001): the privacy policy limits the government’s ability to collect 
information and hence to levy high tax rates.  Accordingly, the 
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privacy policy serves to encourage taxpayers’ investment in activities 
that increase their future earnings. 
Dodds (2003) considers a different setting, where individuals of two 
types benefit from a public good.  The socially efficient quantity of 
the public good depends on the number of high-productivity persons.  
The high-productivity persons are reluctant to reveal themselves as 
they must then contribute relatively more towards the public good.  
The issue is closely related to that of taxpayer compliance where 
taxpayers must report their income subject to government auditing.  
As in the taxpayer compliance analyses (Mookherjee and Png 1989), 
Dodd’s key result is that 100% auditing does not maximize welfare.  
He interprets this to mean that some degree of privacy is socially 
efficient. 
Generally, in competitive settings, an improvement in the accuracy of 
productive personal information may lead the less informed party 
(seller or employer) to include more or exclude some marginal 
persons (consumers or workers).  This is a consequential externality 
on some members of the better-informed side of the market.  The 
consequential externality might be positive or negative.  It is 
surprising that the grounds for privacy do not seem to be weaker with 
respect to productive as contrasted with non-productive personal 
information. 
 
4.  Cross-Market Consequential Externalities 
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In this section, we consider how the collection of personal 
information in one market for use in another market affects the 
efficiency of market outcomes.15   The collection and use impose a 
consequential (rather than direct) externality. For the most part, cross-
market consequential externalities apply to the secrecy dimension of 
privacy.  
Marketers may compile customer databases for sale to third parties.  
For example, email portals may pass personal details of account 
holders to third parties who then use the information to promote their 
goods and services.  The policy implications with respect to the third-
party “information buyers” are similar to those in the cases that we 
have reviewed in the preceding section.  Hence, we consider only the 
actions of the “information sellers”. 
The central theme is that the marketer may have even more incentive 
to collect consumer information in a cross-market than in a within-
market setting.  Recall the monopoly model of within-market 
collection and use of non-productive information over time.  As 
analyzed in Section 3.1, the seller has an excessive incentive to price 
high in the first period and so identify the high-type consumers.   
 
 
 
15  Cross-market externalities imply “secondary use” of personal information.  
Secondary use can also occur within the same market.  For instance, a marketer 
might use a delivery address submitted for an online purchase to promote 
related items. 
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This incentive is reinforced if the seller can sell the personal 
information collected to third parties – the revenue from selling 
customer information would raise the marginal return from the price 
experiment (Taylor 2004a).   Hence, the seller is more likely to set a 
high first-period price.  When demand is somewhat elastic (i.e., the 
seller would sell to all consumers absent the opportunity to sell 
information), the option to sell consumer information would lead the 
seller to restrict output, and hence, reduce welfare. 
Addressing a similar problem, Calzolari and Pavan (2005) develop a 
very sophisticated model that considers interaction between two 
different uninformed parties, say sellers, with a single informed party, 
say a buyer whose characteristics are private information, over time.  
They identify conditions under which the early seller will transfer 
information about the buyer to the later seller.  In particular, when the 
early seller is not interested in the exchange between the buyer and 
later seller, the buyer’s valuations towards the two sellers’ products 
are positively correlated, and the buyer’s preferences in the two 
sellers’ products are separable, then the early seller may prefer to 
protect the buyer’s privacy.   
By contrast, when any one of these conditions is not met, the early 
seller can capture additional rents arising from information or 
contractual externalities.  The effect of privacy on welfare is 
ambiguous – privacy may promote the exchange between the buyer 
and later seller, but it could also introduce new distortions in the 
buyer’s exchange with the early seller. 
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Overall, it seems that the selling of personal information benefits 
“information buyers” (secondary sellers).  As for social welfare in 
secondary markets, it could increase or decrease depending on the 
composition of the consumer population (as discussed in Section 3 
above).  However, in the primary market, where the personal 
information is collected, welfare may decrease because sellers have 
greater incentive to raise price in order to classify consumers 
(Calzolari and Pavan 2005; Taylor 2004a).  The primary sellers can 
then compile customer information for sale to secondary sellers.  
Therefore, a cross-market externality may emerge when sale of 
consumer information is allowed. 
In general, sale of consumer information is more likely to be 
beneficial when the potential of such information is high, e.g., when 
the classification of consumers can help to match seller offers and 
interested consumers.  If the information does not lead to more 
efficient exchange in secondary markets, then it may be worthwhile to 
discourage its sale, which would in turn discourage primary sellers 
from collecting the information. 
 
5.  Direct Externalities  
In this section, we consider direct externalities arising from the 
collection and use of personal information within the same market 
and across markets.  Direct externalities apply to the secrecy, 
autonomy, and seclusion dimensions of privacy.   
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A major use of personal information is to direct unsolicited 
promotions by mail, telephone, email, and in person.  To the extent 
that such solicitations impose costs on consumers that marketers 
ignore, they generate a negative externality (Petty 2000).   
Van Zandt (2004) analyzes a setting where heterogeneous sellers send 
messages to promote different items.  Consumer attention is a scarce 
resource – each consumer can process a limited number of messages.  
Hence, consumers incur costs to “open” marketing messages.  They 
respond to sellers and purchase if and only if they have read the 
messages and are interested in the item.  Sellers have private 
information on consumer interests, and they decide strategically how 
many messages to send, and which consumers to target.  Sellers may 
over-promote their products.  Accordingly, measures that inhibit 
solicitations (e.g., that increase communication cost or a tax on 
solicitations) may help sellers to focus their marketing effort and 
hence improve social welfare.16   
In a similar setting, Anderson and de Palma (2005) show that over-
promotion by sellers could even lead to market failure – the quality of 
 
 
 
16  However, the sellers’ profits would increase only if they have sufficiently 
accurate data on consumer interest (Van Zandt 2004).  To this extent, consistent 
with the Chicago School’s view, privacy (or more specifically, secrecy) of 
personal information may not be desirable. 
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messages may become so low that consumers choose not to read any 
messages.  Such market failure is reminiscent of the well-known 
“lemons” problem (Akerlof 1970).  Evidently, increasing solicitation 
cost could well raise welfare, and therefore regulation may play a 
positive role.17   
Akcura and Srinivasan (2005) consider the cross-market collection 
and use of information.  Sellers may collect personal information 
about consumers in a primary market and use it in a secondary 
market.  In deciding how much personal information to reveal, 
consumers balance the benefit from consuming the primary item 
against direct privacy costs.18  The higher the rate at which consumers 
expect sellers to cross-sell personal information, the less information 
consumers would reveal.  Accordingly, sellers may choose to limit the 
extent to which they cross-sell personal information, and so, persuade 
consumers to provide more information in the primary market. 
 
 
 
17  See also Hermalin and Katz (2004a).  Further, Gantman and Spiegel (2004) 
consider the trade-off in software that incorporates advertising banners 
(“adware”) between the benefit to consumers of receiving targeted information 
which improves their choice of product against the privacy cost. 
18 Akcura and Srinivasan (2005) do not specify the nature of these costs, but 
they could presumably encompass the inconvenience from receiving unsolicited 
direct marketing and the harm from possible intrusion into the seller’s database.   
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Hann et al. (2005a) analyze direct marketing in a setting with two 
types of consumer – one with a high value for the item being 
marketed and the other with a low value.  Each direct marketing 
solicitation causes some harm, but a consumer can get the item only 
through the solicitation.  Consumers can take actions to reduce the 
harm (“marketing avoidance”).  For instance, to avoid telemarketing 
solicitations, consumers can conceal (e.g., by registering with do-not-
call lists) or deflect (e.g., by screening incoming telephone calls).  
Sellers cannot distinguish the consumer types ex ante.  Ideally, they 
would promote only to high-type consumers.  Instead, they incur costs 
to solicit the entire consumer population, and then discover consumer 
types ex post. 
Seller solicitations are a strategic complement (Bulow et al. 1985) 
with concealment by low-type consumers.  If the cost of concealment 
measures were to fall, low-type consumers would raise concealment, 
and sellers would increase marketing.  Indeed, since 2003, the U.S. 
enforcement of a nation-wide “do not call list” may have led to an 
increase in the return on investment from telemarketing (Direct 
Marketing Association 2004).  However, from a welfare perspective, 
consumer concealment is less favorable then deflection, because it 
concentrates seller solicitations on a smaller number of consumers 
(Hann et al. 2005a).  A consumer needs only one solicitation to enjoy 
the product, and additional solicitations add to harm.  Accordingly, 
concentrating the solicitations raises the expected harm relatively 
more than the benefit. 
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Although the scenarios of hacking and eavesdropping appear to be 
quite different from that of direct marketing, the formal analysis is 
quite closely related.  Consumers who provide information to vendors 
or use communication services may be subject to covert intrusions 
into their privacy, which impose direct and indirect costs.  In 
response, consumers could take defensive actions like encoding and 
encryption, which are costly and might also diminish the benefit from 
consumption (Noam 1995a).  The strategic impact of such defensive 
actions could be analyzed in the same way as marketing avoidance 
(Hann et al. 2005a) and, more generally, private security (Koo and 
Png 1994). 
The research just reviewed emphasizes externalities from one side of 
a market to another.  Another important class of direct externalities is 
that of peer-to-peer externalities.  August and Tunca (2004) study the 
incentives of end users to patch security flaws in computer systems.  
Computer viruses exploit flaws in one computer system to penetrate 
others, and are more likely to succeed the fewer users patch flaws.  
The key policy implication is that, where users differ in their value 
from use of the system, mandatory patching is not optimal. 
Although August and Tunca focus on computer viruses, their analysis 
may apply more generally to applications in which consumers reveal 
the personal information of others.  Examples of such applications 
include instant messaging services and online communities (e.g., 
friends.com), where users are asked to refer their peers to service 
providers.  In some cases, service providers may even covertly 
traverse the email boxes of users to recruit new potential users (much 
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like the way computer viruses infect other systems).  Despite the risks 
of such privacy invasion, August and Tunca’s analysis suggests that 
mandating users to protect privacy need not be optimal. 
Overall, it is clear that, in circumstances involving direct externalities, 
privacy of personal information would increase social welfare.  
However, sweeping solutions, such as disallowing the collection and 
use of personal information, would not be optimal – they would 
prevent interested consumers from enjoying the items being promoted 
(Van Zandt 2004; Anderson and de Palma 2005; Hann et al. 2005a) or 
cause consumers to forego some implicit benefits (Akcura and 
Srinivasan 2005). 
 
6. Property Rights 
Will the appropriate assignment of property rights (self-regulation) 
resolve the issue of privacy?  The Chicago School posits that a free 
market for information yields social efficiency.  Hence, an explicit 
allocation of property rights may shift society away from a socially 
efficient equilibrium and reduce welfare.  For instance, granting 
workers property rights to their personal information may cause an 
employer to reduce employment. 
In their analyses of both non-productive and productive information, 
Hermalin and Katz (2004b) show that the market outcome is identical 
regardless of how property rights over personal information are 
assigned.  Specifically, in the case of non-productive information, the 
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monopoly seller can compel customers to reveal their type.  In the 
case of competition with productive information, high-type workers 
will identify themselves, thus revealing the low types.  Similarly, 
Kahn et al. (2000) show that, if there is sufficient flexibility in 
contracting, information would be revealed to an efficient degree.  
The outcome obeys the Coase Theorem – it does not matter whether 
or how property rights to personal information are initially assigned.19 
However, the analyses of Hermalin and Katz (2004b) and Kahn et al. 
(2000) apply to situations where the collection and use of personal 
information take place within the same (primary) market.  What if the 
relatively uninformed party uses the information in secondary 
contexts as, for instance, when a marketer sells consumer information 
gathered at one website to third-party spammers?  Then a cross-
market externality will arise.  The parties with personal information 
will certainly consider the cross-market externality when deciding 
how much personal information to reveal (Akcura and Srinivasan 
2005).   
The impact of the allocation of property rights to personal information 
in the primary market may well depend on the relation between the 
party’s positions in the primary and secondary markets.  Will a high 
type worker in the primary market also be a high type worker in the 
 
 
 
19 See also Chellappa and Shivendu (2003). 
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secondary market?  When the secondary use of the information is 
uncertain, property rights may have a role. 
Further, in the case of direct externalities, property rights would 
clearly help to resolve the harms that sellers impose on consumers, 
and also peer-to-peer harms among consumers.   
Therefore, it may be worthwhile to attach a value to personal 
information, at least in terms of restricting future uses of the 
information.  The challenge then lies in how such a value is 
determined. 
The first issue is that the parties with property right over their 
personal information may not fully take account of the potential 
benefit of the information to uninformed parties.  For instance, a 
common regulatory remedy for unsolicited promotions is the “do not 
contact” list.  However, potential consumers may ignore sellers’ profit 
when deciding to register with “do not contact” lists, and hence may 
tend to over-register relative to the welfare optimum (Anderson and 
de Palma 2005).20 
 
 
 
20 In 2003, the U.S. government established a nationwide “do not call” registry.  
By August 18, 2005, the registry has recorded 100 million entries (Federal 
Trade Commission 2005b). 
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It is quite natural to expect that allowing consumers to set their own 
values for personal information may lead them to over-value data 
(Schwartz 2004).  Hence, the second issue is that consumers may 
attach too high a price to their personal information, which might 
excessively raise the barrier to potential buyers of the information.  
Specifically, economic experiments have repeatedly shown that 
people demand a higher price for a property when another person 
seeks to use it than the price that they would offer to protect the 
property from being used (see, e.g., Boyce et al. 1992).   
In the context of personal information, individuals’ “willingness to 
accept” (WTA) for use of their personal information (when they have 
explicit property rights over the information) may exceed their 
“willingness to pay” (WTP) for protection of their information from 
exploitation (when no property right is granted).  Granting property 
rights to individuals and allowing them to name their own price may 
lead to under-usage of information, whereas allowing the free use of 
personal information could lead to over-usage.   
The difference between WTA and WTP for personal information 
could help explain the disparate findings from opinion polls (e.g., 
Harris Interactive 2001, 2003) and behavioral experiments (e.g., 
Ackerman et al. 1999; Hann et al. 2003; Hui 2004; Hui et al. 2004).  
Specifically, when polled for their opinions on or attitudes towards 
privacy, people may assume they “own” their personal information 
and hence demand a high price for use of their information.  By 
contrast, when confronted with actual information requests and when 
they realize that protecting their personal information may be “costly” 
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(e.g., they may not be able to use a website or complete a transaction 
if they do not supply the information), they demand less 
compensation.  The behavioral experiments cited above have shown 
that people provide their information in exchange for even small 
rewards or incentives.   
Clearly, it would be misleading to judge the importance of privacy 
from opinion polls alone.  Rigorous experiments are necessary to 
gauge the actual value that people attach to their personal information 
under various circumstances.  Perhaps the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
(BDM) mechanism (Becker et al. 1964) can be employed to elicit the 
incentive-compatible reservation prices that people place on their 
personal information.  It would be important to recognize the likely 
gap between WTA and WTP, and assess the benefits of allocating 
property rights accordingly. 
 
7.  Regulation 
Assignment of property rights will resolve privacy issues only in 
contexts where the collectors and users of personal information and 
their subjects of the information can enter into contractual 
arrangements.  But what about contexts where such arrangements are 
inconvenient or even impractical, for instance, widespread peer-to-
peer externalities in the decision of computer users whether to patch 
security vulnerabilities?  In law, this is the domain of tort law and 
regulation as contrasted with contract law. 
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Tang et al. (2005) consider a setting where intrusion of privacy 
imposes a direct cost on consumers.  Consumers differ in their 
sensitivity to intrusion while sellers differ in their cost of protecting 
privacy.  When few consumers are sensitive, welfare is maximized 
with a regime of “caveat emptor”, as businesses avoid the cost of 
protecting privacy.  By contrast, when many consumers are sensitive, 
welfare is maximized with mandatory privacy regulation, as 
consumers avoid the cost of comprehending each business’ privacy 
policy.  In the intermediate case, welfare is maximized with privacy 
seals – the low-cost businesses choose to purchase the seal, while the 
high-cost businesses do not. 21 
A key reason in favor of regulation is that it may be a more effective 
form of commitment than contractual arrangements.  Our review 
above (Sections 3, 4, and 5) has pointed to various situations of both 
consequential and direct externalities where commitment to protect 
privacy increases welfare.  Specifically, analyses of behavior-based 
price discrimination in competitive settings show that businesses may 
benefit from privacy of personal information (Fudenberg and Villas-
Boas 2006).   
 
 
 
21  Information providers could also commit to privacy protection through 
service-level agreements with their users (Pau 2005). 
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Ironically, business interests oppose proposals to tighten privacy 
regulation.  The U.S. national cost of complying with these legislative 
proposals has been estimated to be US$9-36 billion (Hahn 2001).  For 
just catalog and Internet clothing retailers, the Direct Marketing 
Association estimated that opt-in restrictions to use of demographic 
information by third parties would raise costs by US$1 billion (Turner 
2001). 
The economic analysis of consequential externalities suggests that 
whether and how privacy increases welfare depends on the particular 
circumstances.  Consequently, there will be no magic “one size fits 
all” solution, but rather, regulation should be tailored to the 
circumstances.   For instance, communication between persons with a 
particular relationship, including husband-wife, penitent-clergy, 
patient-doctor, attorney-client, citizen-census taker is commonly 
protected by “privilege”.  The patient-doctor privilege encourages an 
uninhibited exchange of information and so, enhances overall 
community health (Noam 1995a).   
Muris (2003) had proposed to generally allow free use of personal 
information, while focusing enforcement against misuse.  The focus 
on information use is consistent with consumer preferences (Wathieu 
and Friedman 2005).  However, in the studies that we reviewed in 
Sections 3 and 4, welfare could be reduced by apparently legitimate 
uses of information that did not cause direct harms.  Hence, 
requirements for consumer consent to collection and use of personal 
information (as stipulated in the Fair Information Practices) could 
raise social welfare.  Accordingly, the key issue is how to balance the 
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interests of sellers and consumers, and obviously a sweeping “use” or 
“no use” solution would not work across all contexts.  Wherever it is 
feasible to ascertain the benefits and costs of information use, the 
obvious solution is industry-specific regulation, as in the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act of 1970. 
Regulation must be tailored even with regard to direct externalities, 
for which it is unambiguous that privacy would raise welfare.  As 
mentioned earlier, a common regulatory remedy for unsolicited 
promotions is the “do not contact” list.  While a “do not call” list may 
resolve telemarketing, a similar “do not spam” list might be counter-
productive.  Illicit spammers account for the bulk of spam, and they 
might well spam addresses on the “do not spam” list (Hahn 2003; 
Muris 2003).  With regard to spam, a tax appears to be the most 
promising solution (Kraut et al. 2002; Van Zandt 2004; Anderson and 
de Palma 2005), and generally, deflection is to be preferred over 
concealment (Hann et al. 2005a). 
 
8.  Empirical Evidence 
To gauge the economic significance of privacy as a public policy 
issue, it is vital to know how much people value their privacy.   Polls 
and surveys have repeatedly shown that people are concerned about 
privacy (Westin 2001).  However, the key policy issue is not whether 
individuals value privacy.  It is obvious that people value privacy.  
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What is not known is how much people value privacy and the extent 
to which people differ in their valuations.   
Despite tremendous debate and policy interest, there has, to date, been 
little research into this question (Hahn 2001).  Indeed, it has been 
conjectured that “measuring the value of consumer privacy may prove 
to be intractable” (Ward 2001).   
Recent opinion surveys and experimental research provide some 
insights into this question.  In November 1998, among 381 U.S. 
respondents to an online survey, most were willing to reveal personal 
information but would not reveal personal identifying information 
(Ackerman et al. 1999).  For instance, 58% would report income, 
investments, and investment goals to obtain customized investment 
advice, but only 35% would also reveal their name and address.   
In May to June 2000, the Pew Internet and American Life Project 
found that, among 1,017 American Internet users, 54% would provide 
personal information in order to use a website, whereas only 27% 
were hard-core privacy protectionists who would never provide their 
personal information to websites (Fox et al. 2000).  In February to 
March 2003, the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of 
Pennsylvania found that, among a sample of 1,200 respondents aged 
18 years or older who used the Internet at home, most who did not 
accept a website’s data collection policy would nevertheless disclose 
their real name and email address if they valued the website (Turow 
2003).   
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More compelling than surveys are various experiments that gauged 
subjects’ willingness to reveal personal information.  Hui et al. (2004) 
conducted a field experiment to measure the likelihood that 
individuals would provide personal information to Internet 
businesses.  By estimating a discrete choice model using real online 
participation data, they found that people were willing to disclose 
more personal information in exchange for small monetary incentives.  
Similarly, in laboratory experiments, simple interface redesign could 
induce consumers to disclose more personal information (Hui 2004), 
or opt-in to receiving future newsletters (Lai and Hui 2004, 2005). 
Wattal et al. (2004) procured data from field experiments conducted 
by an e-commerce vendor.  The vendor contacted potential customers 
with different dimensions of customization – some received 
customized product information, while others received personalized 
greetings, e.g., “Dear Ms ABC”.  Consumers responded positively to 
customized product offerings, but negatively to personalized 
greetings. 
Wathieu and Friedman (2005) suggest that privacy concerns are 
sensitive to indirect consequences of information transmission.  In 
particular, they argue that personal information may not have intrinsic 
value, and the flow of personal information may not be the key 
privacy concern.  Rather, it is the concern about information use that 
affects consumer behavior.  Their argument was supported in an 
experiment that involved 647 subjects from a U.S. business school 
research pool. 
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An experiment at Humboldt University provides further indirect 
evidence (Berendt et al. 2005).   206 volunteers interacted with an 
anthropomorphic 3-D shopping bot to select a compact camera or 
winter jacket.   The bot engaged subjects in dialogue about product 
attributes and also posed ‘soft’ questions typical of selling in 
conventional stores.  The experimental subjects willingly revealed 
personal identifying information to the bot, specifically, 35-40% 
provided their home address. 
Earp and Baumer (2003) conducted an online survey with 415 
respondents.  Each respondent was randomly shown one of 30 web 
pages, from well- or lesser known retail, medical/health, and financial 
sites.  Respondents were most willing to reveal gender and age, and 
least willing to reveal their social security numbers.  Moreover, they 
were significantly less willing to provide personally identifiable 
information (phone number, home address, email address, social 
security number, and credit card number) to lesser known than well-
known web sites. 
The surveys and experiments clearly show that people value privacy, 
but to an extent less than some privacy advocates have claimed.  In 
particular, many survey respondents indicated use of websites as a 
sufficient motivation to provide personal information.  The results 
suggest that consumer information can be directly solicited in 
exchange for simple monetary or procedural measures.  Further, they 
also suggest that governments should evaluate practical implications 
for Internet businesses before introducing stringent privacy 
regulations.   
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A question related to individuals’ value for privacy in general is how 
they value the use of their personal information.  A set of conjoint 
analyses at Singapore and U.S. universities show that people are 
willing to bear the risks of improper access to or secondary use of 
their information in exchange for monetary incentives or increased 
convenience (Hann et al. 2003).  In particular, the U.S. and Singapore 
subjects valued improper access to personal information at around 
US$11-20, whereas they valued secondary use at around US$8-27. 22  
Hence, despite consumers’ protests against price discrimination, sale 
of personal information to unauthorized third parties, spam, etc., it 
may indeed not be that difficult to convince them to agree to these 
information uses. 
Hann et al. (2003) also identified three distinct segments in the 
consumer population – privacy guardians (the majority), information 
sellers, and convenience seekers.  However, these segments were not 
significantly correlated with demographic characteristics.  By 
contrast, using census data, Varian et al. (2004) identified household 
characteristics of telephone numbers registered with the U.S. national 
“do not call” list.  Those with annual incomes exceeding US$100,000 
and college-level education were significantly more likely to register, 
while those with a member in the 13-19 age group were significantly 
 
 
 
22  See also Baumer et al. (2005) for the use of experimental economics to 
quantify the values that consumers place on privacy and security. 
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less likely to register.   It is intuitive that wealthier households would 
suffer more annoyance from telemarketing calls.  Why households 
with teenagers suffer relatively less is more of a puzzle. 
In the context of direct email marketing, marketers do not bear the 
privacy costs imposed on consumers.  Since the cost of spam is very 
low (e.g., Muris 2003), do spammers broadcast their solicitations 
randomly?  In a field experiment, Hann et al. (2005b) find that spam 
is not random but rather targeted.  Specifically, the incidence of spam 
was higher among email accounts created with particular service 
providers, accounts with particular declared interests, and accounts 
associated with persons more likely to make online purchases 
(Americans rather than Singaporeans, adults rather than teenagers).   
Further, the spam arena provides evidence of the relative 
effectiveness of regulation vis-à-vis self-regulation.  Websites do 
indeed comply with their published privacy policies (Jamal et al. 
2003). Hence, if self-regulation of privacy were economically 
efficient, it could work.   Further, mandatory regulation tends to drive 
out self-regulation: websites in the United Kingdom, which mandates 
privacy regulation, provide stronger privacy protection than those in 
the United States, which follows a self-regulatory approach (Jamal et 
al. 2005). 
To conclude, the evidence so far indicates that consumers are not 
truly so sensitive about privacy.  Economic solutions, such as the 
exchange of personal information for monetary incentives, 
convenience, or special resources, may suffice to regulate the market 
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for personal information (Noam 1995b; Laudon 1996).  The 
contentious debate about privacy regulation may have been 
misdirected – the question does not lie in whether tighter control 
should be placed on information collection and use, but in setting the 
right “prices” for personal information.  
 
9.  Future Directions 
Clearly, a free market in personal information will not provide an 
economically efficient outcome.  With regard to consequential 
externalities within and across markets, privacy over personal 
information may raise or lower welfare depending on the 
circumstances.  This should not be surprising, as, generally, the 
direction of welfare gain in “second-best” situations is a priori 
ambiguous.   Given that, it would be interesting to explore whether 
privacy regulation is relatively more likely to increase welfare in the 
context of non-productive as compared with productive information. 
We see several other directions for future research.  First, in all of the 
various models that apply the asymmetric information approach, it is 
assumed that the uninformed party knows of the existence of the 
parties with private personal information and knows their distribution 
of personal characteristics, but just doesn’t know the characteristics of 
individual persons.  For instance, in the setting of Acquisti and Varian 
(2005), only high types buy in the first period, so everyone else must 
be a low type.  But what if the uninformed party doesn’t even know 
the distribution of personal characteristics?  Would the results be the 
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same if the analysis begins from the uninformed party’s beliefs about 
the distribution of the other party’s personal characteristics? 
Second, personal information, like information in general, is a public 
good (Stigler 1980).  Economists have given little attention to the 
public-good aspects of privacy, specifically, the conditions for the 
optimal production and usage when the marginal cost of usage is zero.  
For instance, if disclosure of AIDS test results were mandatory, 
individuals might forgo testing, which would lead to unintended 
adverse consequences (Hermalin and Katz 2004b).   
Third, as our discussion of WTP vis-à-vis WTA makes clear, there is 
substantial potential to apply behavioral economics for a better 
understanding of privacy. Personal information is such a sensitive 
thing that individual behavior is relatively more likely to depart from 
the rational model with respect to personal information than other 
things.  Preliminary research has shown that consumers may often not 
have well defined preferences on privacy – it is possible to influence 
their willingness to reveal or consent to use of their personal 
information by varying data solicitation procedures, even trivially 
(Hui 2004; Lai and Hui 2004, 2005). 
Fourth, prior research and discussion has focused on privacy of 
personal information.  Do the same analyses and conclusions apply to 
privacy of corporate information?  Under what circumstances does 
protection of corporate information raise social welfare?  This 
question is the counterpart to a key issue in accounting research, viz., 
disclosure.  The issue of corporate privacy also bears on two other 
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concepts – trade secrets in intellectual property and corporate 
reputation.23 
Finally, we should mention economics-oriented research into the 
technology of privacy.  Loder et al. (2006) apply the theory of 
mechanism design to devise an incentive-compatible technology to 
screen out spam.  Serjantov and Clayton (2005) use a stylized model 
and a set of email data to examine the implications of various spam-
blocking strategies.  More generally, an interesting direction for 
research is to apply economics to the technology of privacy, and 
specifically, issues of system and software security. 
 
 
 
23  For a preliminary discussion on corporate privacy and the related regulatory 
considerations, see Posner (1978, 1979). 
 
 
 
46                                                     K.L. Hui and I.P.L. Png 
 
 
References 
Ackerman, M.S., L. Cranor and J. Reagle, 1999. Privacy in E-Commerce: 
Examining User Scenarios and Privacy Preferences. In Proceedings of the 
ACM Conference in Electronic Commerce, 1-8. New York: ACM Press. 
Acquisti, A. and H.R. Varian, 2005.  Conditioning Prices on Purchase History.  
Marketing Science, 24 (3), Summer, 367-381.  
Akçura, M. Tolga, and Kannan Srinivasan, 2005.  Research Note: Customer 
Intimacy and Cross-Selling Strategy.  Management Science, 51 (6), 1007–
1012. 
Akerlof, G.A., 1970.  The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 488-500. 
Anderson, S.P. and A. de Palma, 2005.  A Theory of Information Overload.  
Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Virginia. 
August, T. and T. Tunca, 2004.  Network Software Security and User 
Incentives.  Unpublished manuscript, Graduate School of Business, Stanford 
University.  
Baumer, D.L., J.B. Earp and J.C. Poindexter, 2005. Quantifying Privacy 
Choices with Experimental Economics.  Unpublished manuscript, College of 
Management, North Carolina State University. 
Becker, G.M., M.H. DeGroot and J. Marschak, 1964.  Measuring Utility by a 
Single Response Sequential Method.  Behavioural Science, 9 (July), 226-
232. 
Berendt, B., O. Günther and S. Spiekermann, 2005.  Privacy in E-Commerce: 
Stated Preferences vs. Actual Behavior.  Communications of the ACM, 48 
(4), 101-106. 
Boadway, R., N. Marceau and M. Marchand, 1996.  Investment in Education 
and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy.  Economica, 63 
(250), 171-189. 
 
 
 
The Economics of Privacy                                                                                        47 
 
 
Boyce, R.R., T.C. Brown, G.H. McClelland, G.L. Peterson and W.D. Schulze, 
1992.  An Experimental Examination of Intrinsic Values as a Source of the 
WTA-WTP Disparity. American Economic Review, 82 (5), 1366-1373.  
Bucklin, R.E. and C. Sismeiro, 2003.  A Model of Web Site Browsing Behavior 
Estimated on Clickstream Data.  Journal of Marketing Research, 40 (3), 
249-267. 
Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer, 1985.  Multimarket Oligopoly: 
Strategic Substitutes and Complements.  Journal of Political Economy, 93 
(3), June, 488-511. 
Bulow, J., and P. Klemperer, 2006.  Privacy and Prices.  Discussion paper, 
Nuffield College, Oxford University. 
Calzolari, G. and A. Pavan, 2005.  On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential 
Contracting. Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming. 
Camp, L.J. and C. Osorio, 2003.  Privacy Enhancing Technologies for Internet 
Commerce.  In Petrovic, O., M. Ksela, M. Fallenböck, C. Kittl, eds., Trust in 
the Network Economy, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 317-332. 
Chellappa, R.K. and S. Shivendu, 2003.  A Property Rights Approach to 
Consumer Concerns of Privacy in Online Personalization: Incentives and 
Welfare Implications.  http://ssrn.com/abstract=457003  [Accessed August 
15, 2005] 
Chellappa, R.K. and R. Sin, 2005.  Personalization versus Privacy: An 
Empirical Examination of the Online Consumer’s Dilemma,” Information 
Technology and Management, 6 (2-3), 181-202. 
Chen, Y. and G. Iyer, 2002.  Consumer Addressability and Customized Pricing.  
Marketing Science, 21 (2), 197-208. 
Chen, Y., C. Narasimhan and Z. J. Zhang, 2001.  Individual Marketing with 
Imperfect Targetability. Marketing Science, 20 (1), 23-41. 
Choudhury, V., A. Ghose, T. Mukhopadhyay and U. Rajan, 2005. Personalized 
Pricing and Quality Differentiation.  Management Science, 51 (7), 1120-
1130. 
 
 
 
48                                                     K.L. Hui and I.P.L. Png 
 
 
Culnan, M.J. and J.R. Bies, 2003.  Consumer Privacy: Balancing Economic and 
Justice Considerations.  Journal of Social Issues, 59 (2), 323-342. 
Direct Marketing Association.  The DMA 2004 Response Rate Report.  New 
York, October 2004. 
Dodds, S., 2003.  Privacy and Endogenous Monitoring Choice When Private 
Information is a Public Good.  Department of Economics, Carleton 
University, December. 
Earp, J., and D. Baumer, 2003. “Innovative Web Use to Learn about Consumer 
Behavior and Online Privacy, Communications of the ACM, 46 (4), 81-83.  
Eddy, E.R., D.L. Stone and E.F. Stone-Romero, 1999.  The Effects of 
Information Management Policies on Reactions to Human Resource 
Information Systems: An Integration of Privacy and Procedural Justice 
Perspectives.  Personnel Psychology, 52, 335-358. 
Federal Trade Commission, 2005a.  Internet Service Provider Settles FTC 
Privacy Charges.  March 10.  
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/cartmanager.htm [Accessed April 8, 2005]. 
Federal Trade Commission, 2005b.  Statement of Federal Trade Commission 
Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras on the 100 Millionth Number on the 
National Do Not Call Registry 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/dncstatment.htm. [Accessed September 14, 
2005]. 
Fox, S., L. Rainie, J. Horrigan, A. Lenhart, T. Spooner and C. Carter, 2000.  
Trust and Privacy Online: Why Americans Want to Rewrite the Rules. Pew 
Internet & American Life Project, Washington DC.  
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=19 [Accessed March 31, 
2005] 
Fudenberg, D. and J.M. Villas-Boas, 2006. Behavior-Based Price 
Discrimination and Customer Recognition, this Handbook. 
Gantman, N. and Y. Spiegel, 2004. Adware, Shareware, and Consumer Privacy.  
Working Paper No. 04-02, NET Institute, October  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=618741 
 
 
 
The Economics of Privacy                                                                                        49 
 
 
Ghose, A. and P.Y. Chen, 2003.  Personalization vs. Privacy: Firm Policies, 
Business Profits and Social Welfare. Working Paper, GSIA, Carnegie 
Mellon University. 
Goodwin, C., 1992.  A Conceptualization of Motives to Seek Privacy for 
Nondeviant Consumption.  Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1 (3), 261-
284. 
Gould, J.P., 1980.  Privacy and the Economics of Information.  Journal of Legal 
Studies, 9 (4), 827-842. 
Hahn, R.W., 2001.  An Assessment of the Costs of Proposed Online Privacy 
Legislation.  Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies. 
Hahn, R.W. and A. Layne-Farrar, 2002.  The Benefits and Costs of Online 
Privacy Legislation.  Administrative Law Review, 54 (1), 85-171.  
Hahn, R.W., 2003.  Outlawing Spam Won’t Work.  Policy Matters 03-36, 
Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
October.   
Hann, I.H., K.L. Hui, T.S. Lee and I.P.L. Png, 2003.  The Value of Online 
Information Privacy: An Empirical Investigation.  AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 03-25, October. 
Hann, I.H., K.L. Hui, T.S. Lee and I.P.L. Png, 2005a.  Consumer Privacy and 
Marketing Avoidance.  Unpublished manuscript, Department of Information 
Systems, National University of Singapore.  
Hann, I.H., K.L. Hui, T.S. Lee and I.P.L. Png, 2005b.  On Spam: Targeted or 
Random? Communications of the ACM, forthcoming.  
Harris Interactive. 2001. Consumer Privacy Attitudes and Behaviors Survey 
Wave II. http://www.bbbonline.org/UnderstandingPrivacy/library/harris2-
execsum.pdf   [Accessed August 15, 2005] 
Harris Interactive. 2003. Most People Are “Privacy Pragmatists” Who, While 
Concerned about Privacy, Will Sometimes Trade It Off for Other Benefits.  
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=365  [Accessed 
August 15, 2005] 
 
 
 
50                                                     K.L. Hui and I.P.L. Png 
 
 
Hart, O.D. and J. Tirole, 1988.  Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics.  
Review of Economic Studies, 55, 509–540. 
Hermalin, B. E. and M.L. Katz, 2004a. Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to 
Exchange an Electronic Message? RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (3), 
423–447. 
Hermalin, B. and M. Katz, 2004b.  Privacy, Property Rights & Efficiency: The 
Economics of Privacy as Secrecy.  Unpublished manuscript, Haas School of 
Business, University of California at Berkeley. 
Hirshleifer, J., 1971.  The Private and Social Value of Information and the 
Reward to Inventive Activity.  American Economic Review, 61 (4), 561-574. 
Hirshleifer, J., 1980.  Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future.  Journal of 
Legal Studies, 9 (4), 649-664. 
Hui, K.L., 2004.  Privacy, Information Presentation, and Question Sequence.  
Unpublished manuscript, Department of Information Systems, National 
University of Singapore.  
Hui, K.L., H.H. Teo and T.S.Y. Lee, 2004.  The Value of Privacy Assurance: A 
Field Experiment.  Unpublished manuscript, Department of Information 
Systems, National University of Singapore.  
Jamal, K., M. Maier and S. Sunder, 2003.  Privacy in E-Commerce: 
Development of Reporting Standards, Disclosure and Assurance Services in 
an Unregulated Market.  Journal of Accounting Research, 41 (2), 285-309. 
Jamal, K., M. Maier and S. Sunder, 2005.  Enforced Standards Versus 
Evolution by General Acceptance: A Comparative Study of E-Commerce 
Privacy Disclosure and Practice in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  Journal of Accounting Research, 43 (1), 73-96. 
Kahn, C.M., J. McAndrews and W. Roberds, 2000.  A Theory of Transactions 
Privacy.  Working Paper 2000-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
Katz, M.L., 1984.  Firm-specific Differentiation and Competition Among 
Multiproduct Firms.  Journal of Business, 57 (1 part 2), S149-S166. 
 
 
 
The Economics of Privacy                                                                                        51 
 
 
Konrad, K.A., 2001.  Privacy and Time-consistent Optimal Labor Income 
Taxation.  Journal of Public Economics, 79, 503-519. 
Koo, H.W. and I.P.L. Png, 1994. Private Security: Deterrent or Diversion? 
International Review of Law and Economics, 14, March, 87-101.  
Kraut, R.E., S. Shyam, J. Morris, R. Telang, D. Filer and M. Cronin, 2002. 
Markets for Attention: Will Postage for Email Help?  CSCW 02, New 
Orleans, ACM, 206-215. 
Lai, Y.L. and K.L. Hui, 2004. Opting-In or Opting-Out on the Internet: Does It 
Really Matter?  In Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Information Systems, Washington D.C., December. 
Lai, Y.L. and K.L. Hui, 2005. Luring the Prey: Attracting Online Consumer 
Participation Through Choice Configurations. In Proceedings of the 
American Market Association (AMA) Marketing and Public Policy 
Conference, Washington D.C., May. 
Laudon, K.C., 1996.  Markets and Privacy.  Communications of the ACM, 39 
(9), 92-104. 
Loder, T.C., M.W. Van Alstyne and R. Wash, 2006.  An Economic Response to 
Unsolicited Communication, Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, 6 
(1), Article 2.  
Moe, W.W. and P.S. Fader, 2001.  Uncovering Patterns in Cybershopping.  
California Management Review, 43 (4), 106-117. 
Moe, W.W. and P.S. Fader, 2004.  Dynamic Conversion Behavior at E-
Commerce Sites.  Management Science, 50 (3), 326-335. 
Montgomery, A.L., S. Li, K. Srinivasan and J.C. Liechty, 2004.  Modeling 
Online Browsing and Path Analysis Using Clickstream Data.  Marketing 
Science, 23(4), Fall, 579–595. 
Mookherjee, D. and I.P.L Png, 1989.  Optimal Auditing, Insurance and 
Redistribution.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (2), 399-415. 
Moorthy, K.S., 1984.  Market Segmentation, Self-Selection, and Product Line 
Design.  Marketing Science, 3 (4), 288–307. 
 
 
 
52                                                     K.L. Hui and I.P.L. Png 
 
 
Muris, T.J., 2003.  The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development 
of U.S. Consumer Protection Policy.  In Aspen Summit: Cyberspace and the 
American Dream, The Progress and Freedom Foundation, August 19. 
Mussa, M. and S. Rosen, 1978.  Monopoly and Product Quality.  Journal of 
Economic Theory, 18 (2), 301-317. 
Noam, E., 1995a.  Privacy in Telecommunications, Part I. New 
Telecommunications Quarterly, (3) 2, September, 51-59. 
Noam, E., 1995b.  Privacy in Telecommunications, Part III. New 
Telecommunications Quarterly, 3 (4), November, 51-60. 
Odlyzko, A., 2003.  Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the 
Internet.  In: Proceedings, 5th ACM International Conference on Electronic 
Commerce. 
OECD, 1980.  OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data.  23 September 1980.  
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1
_1,00.htm. [Accessed May 17, 2005] 
Pau, L.F., 2005.  Privacy Management Contracts and Economics, Using Service 
Level Agreements (SLA).  Working Paper, Rotterdam School of 
Management, RSM Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, Rotterdam 3000, 
Netherlands. 
Petty, R.D., 2000.  Marketing Without Consent: Consumer Choice and Costs, 
Privacy, and Public Policy.  Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 19 (1), 
42-53. 
Png, I., 1998. Managerial Economics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Posner, R.A., 1978.  An Economic Theory of Privacy.  Regulation, May/June, 
19-26.  
Posner, R.A., 1979.  Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation.  Buffalo Law Review, 28, 
1-55. 
Posner, R.A., 1981.  The Economics of Privacy.  American Economic Review, 
71 (2), 405-409. 
 
 
 
The Economics of Privacy                                                                                        53 
 
 
Schwartz, B., 1968.  The Social Psychology of Privacy.  American Journal of 
Sociology, 73 (6), 741-752. 
Schwartz, P.M., 2004.  Property, Privacy, and Personal Data.  Harvard Law 
Review, 117, 2056-2127. 
Serjantov, A. and R. Clayton, 2005.  Modeling Incentives for Email Blocking 
Strategies.  Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS05).  
Sismeiro, C. and R.E. Bucklin, 2004.  Modeling Purchase Behavior at an E-
Commerce Web Site: A Task Completion Approach.  Journal of Marketing 
Research, 41(3), August, 306-323. 
Smith, H.J., 2001.  Information Privacy and Marketing: What the U.S. Should 
(and Shouldn't) Learn From Europe.  California Management Review, 41 
(2), 8-33. 
Spence, A.M., 1973.  Job Market Signaling.  The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 87 (3), 355-74. 
Stigler, G.J., 1980.  An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics.  
Journal of Legal Studies, 9 (4), 623-644. 
Stiglitz, J.E., 1975.  The Theory of Screening, Education and the Distribution of 
Income.  American Economic Review, 65 (3), 283-300. 
Stone, E.F. and L.D. Stone, 1990.  Privacy in Organizations: Theoretical issues, 
Research findings, and Protection mechanisms.  Research in Personnel and 
Human Resources Management, 8, 349-411. 
Tang, Z., J. Hu and M.D. Smith, 2005.  Protecting Online Privacy: Self-
Regulation, Mandatory Standards, or Caveat Emptor.  Working Paper, 
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, April. 
Taylor, C.R., 2004a.  Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer 
Information.  RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (4), Winter, 631-650. 
Taylor, C.R., 2004b.  Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive 
Markets.  Working Paper, Department of Economics, Duke University. 
 
 
 
54                                                     K.L. Hui and I.P.L. Png 
 
 
Tirole, J., 1988.  The Theory of Industrial Organization.  Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Tolchinsky, P.D., M.K. McCuddy, J. Adams, D.C. Ganster, R.W. Woodman 
and H.L. Fromkin, 1981.  Employee Perceptions of Invasion of Privacy: A 
Field Simulation Experiment.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 66 (3), 308-
313. 
Turner, M.A., 2001. The Impact of Data Restrictions On Consumer Distance 
Shopping. Direct Marketing Association. http://www.the-dma.org/isec/9.pdf  
[Accessed August 15, 2003] 
Turow, J., 2003.  Americans & Online Privacy: The System is Broken. 
Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/04_info_society/2003_online_
privacy_version_09.pdf. [Accessed March 31, 2005] 
Van Zandt, T., 2004. Information Overload in a Network of Targeted 
Communication. RAND Journal of Economics, 35(3), Autumn, 542-560. 
Varian, H.R., 1985.  Price Discrimination and Social Welfare.  American 
Economic Review.  75(4), 870-75.  
Varian, H.R., F. Wallenberg and G. Woroch, 2004.  Who Signed Up for the Do-
Not-Call List?  Third Workshop on Economics and Information Security, 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, May. 
Ward, M.R., 2001.  The Economics of Online Retail Markets.  In Gary Madden 
and Scott Savage, Eds. The International Handbook on Emerging 
Telecommunications Networks.  Edward Elgar Publishers. 
Warren S. and L. Brandeis, 1890.  The Right to Privacy.  Harvard Law Review, 
4(1), 193–220. 
Wathieu, L., 2002.  Privacy, Exposure and Price Discrimination.  Harvard 
Business School Marketing Research Paper 02-03, October. 
Wathieu, L., 2004.  Marketing and the Privacy Concern.  Unpublished 
manuscript, Harvard Business School, March. 
 
 
 
The Economics of Privacy                                                                                        55 
 
 
Wathieu, L. and A. Friedman, 2005. An Empirical Approach to Understanding 
Privacy Valuation. Unpublished manuscript, Harvard Business School.  
Wattal, S., P.Y. Chen and R. Telang, 2004.  On Personalization Technology 
Adoption and Information Sharing in Digital Markets. Working Paper, 
Carnegie Mellon University. 
Westin, A.F., 1967.  Privacy and Freedom. New York, NY: Atheneum. 
Westin, A., 2001.  Testimony before U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection, Hearing on “Opinion Surveys: What Consumers Have 
To Say About Information Privacy,” May 8. 
Woodman, R.W., D.C. Ganster, J. Adams, M.K. McCuddy, P.D. Tolchinsky 
and H. Fromkin, 1982.  A Survey of Employee Perceptions of Information 
Privacy in Organizations.  Academy of Management Journal, 25 (3), 647-
663. 
